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《Summary》 
Foreign Investors in Japan and the Search 
for Consensus on Corporate Governance
Michael Connors
　This paper deals with some general issues of corporate governance 
in Japan and suggests that the resolution of certain technical and legal 
problems in this area is important for the eﬃ  cient operation of Japa-
nese companies and, thereby, for the economic welfare of the Japanese 
people.
　The role of foreign investors in advocating governance reform is 
highlighted. Foreign investors own almost 30% of the shares listed on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange and often account for 50-60% of the daily 
traded volume. In that sense, they may be regarded as important 
leaders of the market direction, but many have expressed consider-
able dissatisfaction with what they perceive to be a lack of sound cor-
porate governance in Japan.
　The author suggests that the distortions which exist in corporate 
governance in Japan have emerged as a result of corporate managers 
becoming too powerful and of the substantial weakening of the par-
ties, such as the banks, which were previously able to impose ﬁ nancial 
and operations disciplines. The lack of governance, which the author 
deﬁ nes as “. . . is a system of supervision of corporate management that seeks 
to ensure that companies are managed in an effi cient and fair manner for the 
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benefi t of society as a whole. . .” has, he argues, been deleterious to Japa-
nese corporate eﬃ  ciency, as evidenced by returns on equity （ROE） 
which are low by global standards.
　This vacuum of governance, he suggests, has not been filled by 
those best qualified to do so―the major investing institutions―be-
cause they are themselves constrained by unresolved conﬂ icts of in-
terest.
　The paper suggests some ways in which the system might sensibly 
be reformed and questions the validity of the prevailing system, which 
is excessively dependent on hard legislation and precedent.
　The paper ends with the suggestion that: “The ideal is to facilitate a 
transparent, expertly intermediated, and reasonable supervision of corporate 
management creating a balanced combination of market forces, shareholder 
democracy and legitimate regulation. In the end, there should be no philosophi-
cal gap because we all want the same thing―dynamic and profi table Japanese 
companies. As Winston Churchill once said: “Democracy is the worst form 
of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried 
from time to time.””
